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led by an inter-ministerial governing council.

1991, Kuwait was littered with landmines and other ERW. The gov-

This body was chaired at a senior level by the

ernment of Kuwait had money, so they divided the country into seven

then Minister for Information, Ieng Mouly.

sectors and offered commercial contracts worth about US$100 million

The coordination level body was called the

per sector. Within two years the country was cleared. While this was

Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), and

not regarded as a humanitarian mine clearance program, it did offer

while it was civilian in nature, the initial stages

up some important lessons to the emerging humanitarian programs

of its setup relied on foreign military advisers

overseen or supported by the United Nations. The first was that mine

from Canada, as well as Australia, Belgium,

clearance was not mission impossible, and that large areas of land or

the Netherlands, and New Zealand, along with

huge quantities of ordnance could be cleared—it just took time or

some civilian advisers from Handicap International (now Humanity

money, and Kuwait had the money. Unfortunately, the commercial

and Inclusion) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Soon after it was

companies involved were not allowed to share information with each

formed, and after some interim arrangements including Pan Sothy act-

other, and valuable information on types of ordnance, clearance tech-

ing as the director for a time, the Cambodian government appointed

niques, safety, costs, etc., was not readily available. Sadly, over eighty

the mercurial Sam Sotha as the Director-General of CMAC, who in

deaths were estimated to have occurred during these clearance efforts.

effect became the first formally-appointed national mine action direc-

Also, the Kuwait Government kept changing the clearance criteria

tor in the world, and who oversaw the establishment of a completely

and many organizations had to go over the same ground two or three

nationally-owned mine action program.

times, until the government was satisfied that the ground was cleared.

It is interesting to note that the name CMAC was the first formal

The experience of Kuwait highlighted the need for a precise elabora-

use of the term “mine action.” The term was not precisely defined but

tion of the desired end-state, good coordination, common operating

was used to project a positive approach to dealing with landmines and

and safety standards, and the importance of information sharing.

reflect that the sector was now involved in more activities than just

The sector grows quickly. By the end of the 1990’s, the United

mine clearance. The other UN programs to begin in the early-1990s

Nations was assisting a growing number of countries with funding,

were in Angola and Mozambique. In both these cases, the mine action

technical support, training, and the provision of equipment. These

programs started as part of the peacekeeping missions: the United

included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Jordan, Laos,

Nations Verification Mission to Angola (UNAVEM) and the United

Thailand, and Yemen, with many more mine-affected countries

Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Due to the man-

requesting UN support. The donor response was also growing rapidly

dates of both peacekeeping missions, it took some years before nation-

and in 1999, for example, the United States provided US$79 million

ally-owned programs could evolve.

dollars to thirty-five countries for mine action.2

Kuwait. Another significant mine clearance activity also took place

around the same time. At the end of the First Gulf War in February

National Level Coordination
The first four HMA programs in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia,
and Mozambique were all supported by the United Nations. However,

12

and this drew together all components of the program and listed the
common goals and objectives to be achieved in that year.

they began independently at the country level and were overseen by

In contrast, CMAC initially performed all functions and was estab-

different parts of the United Nations. As a result, different organiza-

lished to be the government policy-advising agency and the operational

tional and coordination models emerged, with the two most different

coordinator. However, CMAC also had its own mine clearance teams,

being in Afghanistan and Cambodia.

which they funded, tasked, and managed. Coordination by CMAC

In Afghanistan, due to the absence of a recognized government

was reasonably effective in the early years, but as time went by, CMAC

from 1989 onwards, UNOCHA was responsible for policy decisions,

became focused on their own operations and funding needs. Because

liaison with neighboring countries and other international agencies,

international NGOs like Mines Advisory Group (MAG), The HALO

dealing with emerging Afghan authorities, resource mobilization,

Trust (HALO), and NPA were also operating in-country, leading to

setting of priorities and standards, etc., effectively playing the role of

competition for funding, confusion about roles, and some duplication

what today we term the national authority. A separate office within

of effort, a separate national authority and regulatory agency was later

UNOCHA oversaw the day-to-day tasking and operations of the

created to resolve the inherent conflict of interest at CMAC.

implementing partners, undertaking quality management functions,

By the mid-1990s, as a lead actor, the United Nations saw that these

collecting and storing data—the functions of a mine action center.

different national coordination models had emerged with varying

The specialist Afghan and international NGOs were the operators,

degrees of success. In response, the then Department of Humanitarian

and they implemented tasks like risk education, survey, battle area

Affairs (DHA) commissioned an ambitious four-country study in

clearance, and mine clearance. The first national level strategic plan

1996. The study team was led by Bob Eaton, and the team undertook

for the Mine Clearance Programme – Afghanistan was issued in 1992,

visits to Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique to look at

General Approach and Background
A lack of stakeholder confidence in released land often arises from

•

as the original records (although with occasional transcription

umentation frequently consists of a disparate collection of paperwork

errors), including additional, limited details from 1982 at those

that can be hard for an individual reader, especially one not familiar

sites where UK military clearance took place, and informa-

with the task, to understand holistically. Even an expert will often have

tion about clearance (usually of individual visible mines) that

significant questions when reviewing such documents about what hap-

occurred over subsequent years

pened and why. While everything may have made complete sense to

•

information in published historical accounts

managers on the ground at the time of the work, if the task documen-

•

information from interviews with veterans

tation does not provide clear and accessible explanations, then later

•

interviews with local people who were present before, during,

readers are left feeling unsure about what went on and why, and IMAS
07.14 defines risk as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.”4 A future
developer looking to use the land for a public project may determine
that further technical activity is necessary just in case. Any such action

and after the conflict
Further information became available as the clearance program
progressed:
•

comparison of what was actually found on the ground during

diminishes, and in some cases wholly destroys the worth of the origi-

previous clearance operations versus information in mine-

nal work, with all its costs, use of resources, and physical risk.

field records, allowing a general assessment of the reliability

In 2010, co-author David Hewitson worked with Bob Eaton of the

of records as well as results of detailed analysis (such as error

Survey Action Centre to develop a process-driven approach to land

brackets for distances and bearings recorded on maps)

release for the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre. The project included

•

other lessons learned during operations

development of a core document that would tell the story of the site.

•

real-world operational key performance indicators (KPIs)

The document aimed to explain:

Significant effort to identify and access potentially relevant infor-

•

what EO to expect at the site (and why);

mation was applied by the LRC throughout the program, recog-

•

how these expectations were reflected in the operational plan;

nizing the importance of doing so to drive confident and credible

•

what was actually found during operations; and

decision-making.

•

what decisions were taken during operations in light of what was
actually found.

Readers of the completed document should understand the task

Stage 3: Analysis and Planning
In addition to analysis of the expected threat type, detectability, and

process from start to finish as a connected narrative that makes sense

distribution, planning included geometric analysis of the expected

and leaves them confident in the decision to release the land as safe for

arrangement of mines: in rows and panels, orientation, and separa-

use. Other associated documents, such as daily narrative logs, detailed

tion. A key concept was that of the minimum survey target (MST):

mapping, quality management records, and certificates should also be

the smallest associated packet of mines defined in terms of numbers of

available for reference where necessary. However, the site implementa-

mines, numbers of rows, separation of rows, and separation of panels.

tion plan (SIP) would be the heart of the documented explanation of

In some cases, planners might have confidence that they were looking

what happened. The process (Figure 2) and associated documentation

for a combination of multiple rows of mines in several panels. In oth-

developed during that work was adopted in the FI MCP.

ers there might be no record but evidence that, if mines were present,

Stage 1: Tasking
In accordance with broader contractual requirements, a task order
specifies the hazardous area to be processed but does not specify land
release methods or any other technical details.

Stage 2: Information Collection
A fundamental part of the ARE process is identifying, accessing, and making use of all available information—not just information about the intended task site but also about the wider context of
operations and contamination, including evidence from previously
completed tasks. In the FI MCP, information was available from a
number of sources:
•

original Argentine records in Spanish created by the minelaying organizations and available for many (but not all) sites,
including sketch maps, number and types of mines, among
other details
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translated UK military records in English; essentially the same

uncertainty about why key land-release decisions were taken. Task doc-

they would be in at least a certain quantity and arrangement (based on
evidence that mines had never been laid in less than a given arrangement). On other occasions, particularly in areas that had been subject
to partial historical clearance, the MST might be a single mine.
The analysis of the MST drove decisions about the width and separation of targeted technical survey (TS) lanes as well as those cases
(where the MST was one or a very small number of mines) when targeted block clearance would be employed. Geometric analysis of the
MST was applied to ensure confidence that any targeted TS could not
go through a contaminated area without encountering at least one
piece of evidence of mines present, nor could adjacent lanes go either
side of a contaminated area (bracketing). In many areas the third
dimension of depth was also important, reflecting the effects of peat or
sand accumulation on top of the original mine contamination layer.5
Further analysis was conducted to identify the most appropriate
areas to target during TS. Where present, records often used paces or

2014 to July 2021 in government-controlled
areas (GCA) and non-government-controlled
areas (NGCA).20 Major deterrents to understanding the full scope of the issue are the lack
of systematic survey and inhibited access to the
NGCA.21 The most prevalent types of encountered EO are the TM-62M, TM-62P, OZM72s, and MON series mines—placed by both
conventional and nuisance mine-laying—as
well as tripwire-initiated hand grenades and
unexploded ordnance (UXO).22 With safety
and access concerns preventing humanitarian clearance operations in the 5-km buffer
zone, the 427-km long contact line is especially
EO-ridden. The costs of the conflict, however,
worsened an already decaying economy.23
The second ABD-listed developmental problem affecting Luhansk and Donetsk regions
is poverty. The 2021 Humanitarian Needs
Overview in Ukraine estimated 1.5 million
people (particularly the elderly) need assistance related to poor living standards, high
unemployment or loss of livelihoods, and food
insecurity.24 Isolated settlements close to the
contact line are especially affected given long
distances to industrial centers, the lack of large
businesses, and significant safety concerns
related to the cultivation of land.25 Exacerbated
by the COVID-19 pandemic and massive
wildfires in 2020, 26 economic insecurity persists as the most pressing issue.27 The Luhansk
regional development strategy (2021–2027)
also listed an inefficient economy as one of
seven barriers to its development, recognizing
that it currently represents one of the poorest
regions in Ukraine.28 Of the two mentioned
regions, DRC-DDG preferred Luhansk due to

Figure 1. LMAD project in Komyshuvakha, Ukraine, 2020–2021.

the location of its HMA operational base there

Image courtesy of DRC-DDG / 2021 / Holodniak and Shapovalov.

and thus the practicality for day-to-day demparticular complex development problem, through an integrated, inclu-

ining operations. DRC-DDG then analyzed the intersectionality of

sive, participatory, and flexible approach.”16 Its first two steps assess the

both conflict- and poverty-affectedness, and identified six target areas:

developmental situation as well as define the target areas.

Hirske, Muratove, Novotoshkivske, Triokhizbenka, Troitske, and

Demining and Development in Donbas. As categorized in the

ABD, conflict (and the consequent EO contamination) continues

The Case of Komyshuvakha. Despite many unique traits,

to be a major developmental and humanitarian problem for eastern

Komyshuvakha is typical for the conflict-affected Popasna district,

Ukraine. Entering its seventh year, the “forgotten crisis”17 in Ukraine

Luhansk region, and thereby much of Donbas, Ukraine. This urban vil-

is far from being over, as the armed conflict continues in the eastern

lage is home to a 3,200-strong community of various national, socio-

regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. Consequent to the conflict between

economic, and age groups.29 Many citizens have lived here all their

the Government of Ukraine and the so-called de facto authorities in

lives, while others settled upon displacement (two percent). As the

2014, massive EO contamination (from 100 to 7,000 sq km)18 is now

administrative center to six dispersed settlements—Druzhba, Nyrkove,

assessed to exist, keeping Ukraine among the top five countries in

Oleksandropillia, Pryvilla, Viktorivka, and Vyskryva— Komyshuvakha

the world per EO casualties in 2019. DRC-DDG’s internal database

serves as a place of congregation for commerce, schooling, celebration,

recorded 2,197 casualties (resulting from 1,206 incidents) from June

and the like. Seventeen shops, two schools and kindergartens, as well as
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Komyshuvakha.

Figure 2. Results chain of DRC-DDG LMAD project in Komyshuvakha, Ukraine.
Image courtesy of DRC-DDG / 2020 / Vovk.

post offices, a pharmacy, a clinic, and a cemetery provide some of the

communal and infrastructural objects (borehole, cemetery, rail-

essential services to the residents. Agricultural fields are used as the primary source of sustenance, supplemented by foraging in the surround-

road tracks, and forest belts).
•

Agriculture and animal husbandry were found to be key entry

ing forests. The linear pattern of the village follows the railway tracks

points for economic reinvigoration (with most beneficiaries

and central road, connecting Komyshuvakha to the city of Popasna and

seeking either micro-business or value-chain livelihood grants

onward to the NGCA.30 However, Komyshuvakha faces many chal-

for milking or fodder machines, mini-cultivators, barns, hay

lenges, and DRC-DDG employed the first instance of the LMAD to

cutters, seeders, corn grinders, press pikers, harvesters, cattle,

assess these comprehensively.

poultry, and the like).

Integrating needs assessments between (and within) HMA and

•

Fourteen renovations of social infrastructure were proposed

developmental programs has increased efficiency and inclusivity, and

by active citizen groups around three recurring themes:

has improved the capacities of staff. Within the scope of this project,

improving access to water, renovating roads, and equipping

DRC-DDG had four specialized fact-finding teams available—NTS,

spaces for youth. 31

EORE, livelihoods, and protection—whose assessments were corre-

No matter how comprehensive LMAD projects are, they will inevi-

lated. For example, protection and livelihoods asked beneficiaries care-

tably require concessions, compromises, and cooperation. For six

fully-selected, HMA-related questions and, upon learning of potential

priority communities, DRC-DDG had three demining teams (with

contamination, conveyed information to the NTS team. Similarly, NTS

NTS capacities) as well as EORE, livelihoods, and protection teams

and EORE teams were able to seek and share information on livelihood

at its disposal; discounting middle management and support staff,

and protection-related topics. Having four integrated teams on the

thirty people were directly engaged. Moreover, it had approximately

ground expanded the outreach, especially in terms of accessing a larger

EUR 260,000 available for its livelihood and community-based initia-

pool of people from different socioeconomic statuses. Lastly, given that

tive (CBI) grants. Aware of its limitations, DRC-DDG reached out to

each team held specialized knowledge, terminology, and methodolo-

a number of international organizations as well as to local, district,

gies, short trainings and frequent coordination meetings were initiated

and regional authorities to find external support. For Komyshuvakha

for cross-training. This reinforced EO awareness among the livelihoods

alone, regional authorities decided to renovate the central road. One

and protection teams and further mainstreamed protection principles

of the polygons (SES-MF-0067a) was delegated to the State Emergency

among HMA teams. As per the ABD approach, DRC-DDG was able to

Services of Ukraine under a different DRC-DDG project. Then, DRC-

holistically discern the most pressing needs in Komyshuvakha:

DDG designed the results chain (see Figure 2) in line with the available

•

Four confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) of 508,703 sq m of
contamination were identified (see Figure 1): two designated

project inputs:
•

Three (and later four) demining teams were deployed using a

as minefields and two as former battle areas. They were all

combination of NTS, technical survey, manual mine clearance,

agricultural areas bordering on two entry-exit roads with key

and battle area clearance. 32

31

Week 1

Week 2

Week 3

Week 4

Week 5

Total

operational staff is present every working day to

Area cleared with
linear method (m2)

22

408

476

456

190

1,552

clearance. HALO’s mentorship involves not only

Vegetation cutting
with strimmer (m2)

200

100

10

370

180

860

0

5

6

5

5

21

Activity Type

Explosive devices
found (#)

Table 2. Explosive items found and area cleared by the SES on Hnutove
minefield (November–December 2020).

provide assistance and advice to those conducting
the practical (e.g., minefield clearance techniques)
but also advice on strategic or logistical considerations for team deployment (i.e., location and accessibility of medical support). While the deminer
training given by HALO personnel is thorough and
wide-ranging, every minefield presents specific
challenges and peculiarities. Through mentorship,

trainees are taught multiple clearance techniques. Training also imi-

SES team leaders and supervisors can continue to grow within their

tates minefield safety procedures including wearing personal protec-

respective roles.

tion equipment (PPE) and following a set working schedule. Unlike

To build on and sustain knowledge gained in their training, SES

other HALO programs worldwide, deminer training in Ukraine places

deminers were subsequently deployed to conduct clearance on a live

a large emphasis on tripwire clearance as this is one of the most com-

minefield near the village of Hnutove, outside Mariupol in southern

mon threat types found.

Donetsk region in November and December 2020. This was done under

Like HALO’s internal deminer training, the SES training concluded

close supervision and mentorship from HALO, who worked alongside

with two modules: medical training and final examinations. While

the SES personnel. HALO surveyed the area in 2017, and teams con-

HALO conducts an additional paramedic training for selected candi-

firmed a threat of anti-vehicle mines and suspected a threat of ERW.

dates, and basic medical training is taught to all trainees and focuses

Due to the presence of minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines, specifically

on procedures for responding to a minefield accident, stabilizing a

the TM-62P3 variant, clearance required the use of the Minelab F3

minefield casualty, and responding to minor non-demining injuries

metal detector with a UXO head attachment. Although more time con-

(e.g., heat stroke, snake bites, sprained ankle, etc.). Final examinations

suming, use of this detector ensures that even the smallest minimum-

are a combination of written tests and appraisals of practical work

metal signatures are found and properly excavated. To ensure the SES

conducted on the training ground. Senior staff examining the trainees

Mariupol detachment had the necessary tools, HALO provided four

evaluate how well a specific area is prepared, processed, and cleared of

vehicles, PPE, and metal detectors purchased under an EU grant.

any metal signals or dummy items. The test also involves appropriate

The participants included twenty-two staff, who were grouped in

tool selection, PPE wearing, and SOP adherence (e.g., proper clearance

four teams of four deminers and one team leader, with a supervi-

depth for signal excavations). Written examinations cover all modules

sor overseeing all teams. An additional SES paramedic was present

taught during the training, including explosive item recognition and

on stand-by. Over the course of twenty-two working days, the four

hypothetical scenarios that test trainees’ responses and adherence to

teams cleared a total of 1,552 sq ms (an average of 70 sq ms per day)

safety procedures.

during which they found a total of twenty-one items of ERW, includ-

Minefield Mentorship. A pivotal aspect of HALO’s ongoing

ing fifteen projectiles (23 mm and 30 mm), four rif le-projected gre-

capacity development is its commitment to SES teams following

nades (VOG-17 and VOG-25), and two rocket-propelled grenades

the completion of deminer training and to ensuring that SES teams

(PG-7S). The results of the training can be found in Table 2.

receive on-site mentorship. This means a senior member of HALO’s

Capacity-Building Challenges and Opportunities

40

Training Outcomes. Although this was only the first of several

clearance methods such as the linear method require an additional

planned practical deployments for the SES, some preliminary out-

level of teamwork with a three-person team working on rotation to

comes shed light on the impact of this exercise. The main lessons

improve efficiency. Participants were also taught about HALO’s meth-

learned for the SES staff deployed were three-fold. Firstly, by experi-

ods to overcome harsh weather conditions such as using a salt-water

encing HALO’s clearance methodology, participants improved their

solution to defrost frozen soil in the winter. Moreover, training cov-

understanding of the difference between targeted and systematic

ered aspects specifically aimed at supervisors and team leaders, such

humanitarian mine clearance. Secondly, an important outcome of the

as ways to accurately track clearance progress on a map. This also shed

training was increased awareness of safety standards, specifically in

light on efforts to reassess NTS data before clearance, establish the

HALO’s extensive safety procedures, casualty evacuation procedures,

correct boundaries, and mark minefields appropriately. These aspects

and methods to calculate and maintain appropriate safety distances

of the training focused not only on ensuring that all activities were

between deminers. Thirdly, participants’ exposure to HALO’s clear-

conducted in line with best practice and IMAS, but also developed

ance methods provided SES staff with examples of how to overcome

the necessary critical thinking to deal with obstacles and find creative

obstacles and improve operational efficiency. One example is that

solutions to problems that arise in the field.

Applying an Intersectional Lens to the Stressors Faced by Mine
Action Staff
Mine action often takes place in places where staff face a multitude

This assertion is broadly in line with research into the link between

of security risks.24 In some contexts, mine action organizations and

notions of masculinity in the military and how it negatively affects

their staff are considered legitimate targets by armed non-state actors

mental health outcomes.29 At the same time, generalized notions of

and are therefore at high risk of being abducted, killed, or injured.25

masculinity are only one factor in a complex net of causation for men-

Furthermore, the prevalence of the use of improvised explosive devices

tal health outcomes, 30 and approaches that ignore other stressors can

means that deminers are now at greater risk of death or injury due

actually serve to further stigmatize men.

to the unpredictability of these devices. In 2018, the Landmine and

In some contexts, it is a common practice for field teams to be

Cluster Munition Monitor identified twenty casualties among demin-

deployed to areas of operations far from their home for long periods

ers in seven countries (four deminers were killed and sixteen injured). 26

of time. For mine action staff with family responsibilities, for example

Research into mental health outcomes of explosive ordnance (EO) dis-

those who are deployed soon after the birth or adoption of children,

posal technicians in the U.S. military suggests that exposure to the

being placed in areas of operations far away from their families can

types of traumatic events described previously can influence the risk

exacerbate stress. This could particularly be a challenge for demin-

of developing negative mental health outcomes such as PTSD, anxiety

ers who are stationed for consecutive weeks in clearance locations

disorders, and major depression.27

compared to those who return home at the end of the working day.

When considering the mental health outcomes of mine action staff,

Furthermore, international staff of mine action organizations fre-

the fact that the sector is traditionally male dominated 28 and the com-

quently reside in shared accommodations, where they not only lack

mon associations with traditionally constructed notions of masculin-

privacy and personal space but are unable to leave the workplace for

ity (i.e., encouraging risk-taking, physical toughness, self-discipline,

long periods of time. This is especially the case for those based in areas

emotional control, or numbness), may be particularly relevant when

where mobility is restricted due to real and perceived safety and secu-

assessing the mental health outcomes of men working in the sector.

rity concerns.

Understanding Mental Health as an Organizational Risk
Taking a proactive approach to the management of mental health

for organizational purposes. While this should be driven by ethical

and building resilience needs to be an objective within mine action.

considerations and duty-of-care responsibilities, the negative rami-

Numerous studies from the humanitarian field and other sec-

fications of poor mental health on an organization’s capacity to ful-

tors with similarities to mine action, such as the military and the

fil its mandate cannot be discounted.

police, make a strong case for promoting the mental health of staff

A Risk Management Approach to Mental Health

78

Different frameworks have been used to varying degrees of suc-

programmes, projects and activities are safe, efficient and effective

cess to address mental health in the workplace as “[t]raditionally,

in achieving their objectives.” 32 IMAS 10.10 Safety and Occupational

mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) actions have been

Health [S&OH] General Requirements states that “the need to reduce

focused on the response and recovery phases of emergencies with

risk and to provide a safe working environment are fundamental

the aims of reducing suffering and re-establishing functioning of

principles of mine action management” and emphasizes the need

those impacted … However, recently this disaster management field

for “developing work practices that contribute to risk reduction.” 33

has begun to expand beyond reactive approaches to encompassing

Even though the title of IMAS 10.10 mentions “occupational health”

more proactive disaster risk management (DRM), with the goal of

there is no reference to the management of stressors or the effects,

disaster risk reduction (DRR).” 31

consequences, or impact of mental health on operations, only stating

Among these different approaches, a mental health risk manage-

that “NMAA and employers […] should establish and maintain S&OH

ment framework is relevant for the mine action sector, given how

management systems.”34 To date, limited research has been conducted

critical managing risk is in every aspect of mine action. According

on organizational stressors in humanitarian work, prompting the need

to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 07.14, “the pur-

for future research to “develop and explore a hybrid risk assessment

pose of risk management in mine action is to identify, assess, con-

tool that draws from generic stress models while also including job-

trol and review risk wherever it may arise, such that mine action

and context-specific stressors.”35

Mental Health Risk Management for Mine Action
CORE RISK AREAS CONSIDERED

POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF STAFF BURNOUT AND MENTAL ILLNESS

OPERATIONAL

Unwell staff are more likely to make poor decisions and less likely to achieve desired

BY RISK MANAGERS

ON THE ORGANIZATION

objectives. Productivity is compromised by absenteeism, presenteeism, 36 and turnover.
SAFETY, SECURITY

Unwell staff are more prone to accidents, illness, and security incidents.

FIDUCIARY

Unwell staff may underperform as stewards of financial resources. Financial losses can
result from absenteeism, presenteeism, and turnover.

REPUTATIONAL

With impaired judgement, unwell staff may engage in toxic behaviors and misconduct,
which could damage the organization’s image and reputation.

INFORMATION

Unwell staff may mishandle or lose data, or leave an organization with no handover.

LEGAL, COMPLIANCE

If staff become unwell as a result of the work, this calls into question whether applicable
laws and regulations are being followed.

ETHICAL

Harm caused by inadequate duty of care and inequality in the protection and services
provided to international staff versus national staff represents organizational failure to
fulfill obligations to protect staff.

Table 1. Focus areas of risk for staff burnout and mental illness. 37

Within mine action there are many risks to consider when address-

evidence-based research and resources that can be used to help shape

ing the duty of care obligation: to promote mental and physical health,

well-being provision and encourage collaboration and innovation

and avoid long-term exhaustion, burnout, injury, or illness.

across all emergency services. The College of Policing have also devel-

The risk management framework should consider the potential

oped the Blue Light Wellbeing Framework. 39 This framework pres-

impact on several core risk areas with varying degrees of severity and,

ents a more holistic approach to the risk management of well-being

based on these factors, develop criteria to monitor the ongoing man-

and mental health, recognizing the role of management as well as the

agement of staff mental health.

responsibility of individuals to manage their mental health.

Mine action can look to other sectors in similar high-risk environ-

Mine action also has positive examples of addressing mental health

ments for examples of effective frameworks and approaches to manag-

issues in the sector. Within the framework of victim assistance, there

ing mental health. These include the police, fire, and rescue services;

is a body of work in psychological support for the family and com-

paramedics; and national militaries. The police force in the United

munity. In recent years, countries such as Cambodia have looked

Kingdom has been reviewing their mental health services’ response

to increase resources to support mental health in conflict-affected

to demonstrate their commitment and determination to understand

communities, although challenges remain.40 Moreover, Humanity &

and address the issues affecting staff and to provide appropriate invest-

Inclusion provide structured support in community-based MHPSS

ment in the key areas they have identified: prevention, early detec-

interventions, aiming to “increase collaboration and coordination

tion of illness, and rehabilitation. Since its initial launch in 2017, the

among actors to reduce mental health risk factors.”41 This practice can

“Oscar Kilo” program has grown rapidly and is now employed by

benefit risk-management frameworks, supporting mine action staff

police forces and fire and rescue services across the United Kingdom.

working in affected communities.

38

Support is provided through an online platform that gives access to

MAG have had positive reactions to investing in dialogue and support on
mental health issues within the organization.
~Darren Cormack, CEO, MAG
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Research shows that psychotherapy is beneficial for some individ-

up to two thirds of individuals who receive treatment with trauma-

uals who develop PTSD as a result of working in high-risk occupa-

focused psychotherapies show only modest improvements and con-

tions (see Moore and Penk, 2019 for a review of PTSD interventions

tinue to meet the diagnostic threshold for PTSD.5,6,7 Limited access to

for active-duty military members and veterans). However, trauma-

psychotherapy services must also be taken into consideration when

focused therapies like PE and CPT have high dropout rates due to the

addressing the psychological needs of HMAP. Moreover, the availabil-

increased distress that often arises when a person actively confronts

ity of psychiatric mental health professionals is significantly limited in

past traumatic events. There is also concern about the overall effec-

countries where demining operations occur.

4

tiveness of these psychotherapeutic interventions. Studies show that

Alternative to Traditional Interventions:

Posttraumatic Growth and Expert Companionship

82

Considering the significant limitations and availability of psy-

transformative change due to reconsideration of previous held beliefs.

chotherapy treatments for PTSD, examining other interventions for

Research identifies five domains of growth following trauma: appre-

mitigating the negative effects of this relatively common and chronic

ciation of life, new possibilities, personal strength, relationships, and

psychiatric condition is imperative. One such approach is applying the

spiritual/existential change.8

principles of posttraumatic growth (PTG) as a means to assist people

The facilitation of PTG is accomplished through the process of

who are managing the negative effects of trauma yet also trying to

Expert Companionship, which is a novel approach based on sound

thrive and grow in the aftermath of trauma.

psychological principles and includes education, distress manage-

PTG is defined as positive psychological changes that occur as a

ment, emotional disclosure, creation of a new life narrative, and

result of the struggle with traumatic events. Instead of thinking of

mission/service (see Tedeschi & Moore, 2020 for a detailed review of

trauma as a specific type of event and subsequent dysfunction, the

Expert Companionship).9 An application of this approach is found at

concept of PTG considers trauma as life experience that can produce

Boulder Crest Foundation, a community-based, nonprofit, multisite

Momentum for Change?
If militaries move away from using OBOD, there is the potential
for increased availability and use of alternative technologies within

in military technology and potentially lower costs could support and
incentivize the transfer of technology to the HMA sector.

the HMA sector, provided that momentum continues and the military

As the viability of alternate technologies within HMA evolves, tech-

does not revert to its historical reliance on exemptions to circumvent

nologies improve and unit costs fall. However, given shifting attitudes

environmental regulation. Increased uptake of alternative technolgies

and understanding of the environmental implications of OBOD, it is

by militaries should play a key role in driving down cost, demonstrat-

important that these alternatives (discussed in the following section)

ing reliability and fitness-for-purpose, increasing technical capacity,

are evaluated on a regular basis.

and addressing any capability gaps.

The current IATG 10.10 suggests that, for less than 1,000 tons,

This is similar to some militaries’ ambitions to transfer to low-

alternative disposal methods to OBOD are not cost-effective.

carbon technology and renewable energy, which could mean access

The basis for this assessment should be challenged and reviewed,

to cheaper and greener technology options for civilian society. Given

because alternative technologies become more cost-efficient as they

countries’ considerable spending on their militaries, there is the

improve. It is also important to understand what has been consid-

opportunity for economies of scale and investment that would create

ered under any option benefit analysis, especially whether it takes

more efficient technological alternatives while lowering costs, incen-

into consideration any environmental remediation that could be

tivizing wider adoption and increased partnerships. Both advances

required in the future to address residual contamination at sites
where munition disposal has taken place.

Alternative Technologies
Safety, cost, and environmental performance must all be consid-

have steadily increased in recent years, and the revenue from recov-

ered in parallel to assess the viability of alternatives. There are no

ered material could support operational costs.12 This is provided

disposal procedures that will have zero environmental impacts, but

that ownership of any scrap is not contested, and that suitable

steps can be taken to minimize the impacts to soil, water, and air.

infrastructure and management controls are in place, with control

This means following the same “as low as reasonably practicable”

measures that certify items are safe and free from explosives.

approach, which is adopted for the management of other non-environmental risks.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA)
report on alternative disposal methods gave a perspective from envi-

As well as good environmental performance, munition disposal

ronmental considerations and concluded that a wide range of alter-

options must be practical and economically viable. The type and state

native treatment technologies have been successfully used instead

of the munition, the amount to be disposed of, local staff training and

of OBOD techniques.13 The criteria used to compare technologies

competencies, consistency with international agreements, and align-

included the scale at which the technology has been developed (i.e., to

ment with applicable national safety, security, and environmental

what degree the technology has been successfully piloted or used full-

regulations are all factors to consider. When selecting an alternative

scale); portability of the technology; and the emissions/outputs of the

to OBOD, basic considerations will include

process—all of which are relevant for the HMA sector.

•

Is the technology safe, reliable, and affordable?

•

Does the technology irreversibly destroy the munition
and its energetic materials?

•

Does the technology guarantee environmental benefits
compared to OBOD?

•

Are there opportunities to safely recover and recycle
munition components to reach near net-zero waste?

•

Can its environmental performance be monitored?

•

Will the public and local community have confidence in
the technology?

An options appraisal process can be used to evaluate and determine
the most feasible and appropriate technology (see Figure 2).

Some technologies have yet to reach full-scale development, including some chemical treatment and chemical neutralization processes
that have applicability in the HMA sector given their portability
but, at the time of the USEPA report, have not yet proven to successfully treat bulk energetic material for extended periods. Any process
requiring the use of chemicals will need the supply, storage, handling,
and disposal of all chemicals or waste by-products managed appropriately. Suitable disposal facilities may not be available in countries
where the HMA sector operates. The throughput capacity and rate
at which munitions and energetic material can be processed by the
technology is also a factor. Some chemical treatments can be slow and
take several hours to fully react, require treatment tanks, and must
be able to treat wastewater. Treatments that convert explosives into

As noted in IATG 10.10, alternatives to OBOD can also create

non-energetic by-products, such as fertilizers, could also be sold to

revenue-generating opportunities such as recycling recovered

generate revenue. This would be subject to quality assurance checks,

materials (e.g., steel, aluminum, and copper). Scrap metal prices

such as checking residual heavy metal content.
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Image 1. A PMC Engineer prepares a remote cut on a 500 lb bomb.
Image courtesy of Golden West.

FIRST STEPS TO LIMITING
CONFLICT POLLUTION IN

Central Vietnam

By Allan Vosburgh [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]

A

wareness and concern are growing worldwide regarding pollution resulting from conflicts. In
Vietnam, decades of wars have left a legacy of contaminated land and increasingly polluted
water. Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West) believes future success in eliminating explosive remnants of war (ERW) will depend on highly-skilled, dedicated Vietnamese technicians who can apply training, tools, and techniques that mitigate ERW without unnecessarily adding
new contaminants to the environment. Open detonations always contribute steel fragments and particles of explosive residue in the ground along with smoke and detonation products in the air. Golden
West is helping to develop facilities, technology, and initiatives that reduce pollution from humanitarian mine action (HMA) operations.
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consistent with IMAS standards; and, importantly, for team compo-

requirements and tasks as received from the Directorate of Mine Action

sition, training, and deployment (i.e., assigning teams appropriately

(DMA), Iraq’s national mine action authority; and (2) deliver results

trained for each task). Accordingly, by mid-2019, UNMAS began

meeting IMAS standards at reduced costs and a higher rate of return.

development of what became a lethality index, which—for the first

Expediency. If the new ideas being developed offered a poten-

time—classified clearance tasks according to environment and techni-

tial low-cost, high-return business model, UNMAS also would need

cal factors (see Time), and assigned values for locations, thereby pro-

to change its statements of work, which initially focused on specific

viding an evidence-based measurement of lethality with implications

requirements for clearance teams and their capability rather than out-

for skillset, time, and cost. The more lethal the task, and the longer

comes, thereby introducing an unintended bias into the process that

the time required for render safe and removal, the greater the skills

favored ICCs largely for reason of expediency: Given that their accredi-

required and associated hourly cost.

tation, team composition, and readiness to deploy solved the urgency

Fit-for-purpose. At the same time, UNMAS began evaluating

issue, ICCs became the only viable clearance solution in the short term.

alternative team compositions and, by mid-2019, introduced on a trial

Double jeopardy. As of 2018, this safe choice pattern began to

basis a light version based on the decades-old, proven rapid response

repeat. New contracts nearly always specified size, capability, and

team (RRT) concept.5 These highly-mobile, cost-effective teams relied

scope that favored bidders with similar, previous experience. This

exclusively on fully-trained Iraqi staff for high-risk search (HRS), EOD,

generic, more-of-the-same approach de facto endorsed the ICC profile

IEDD, and geographic information systems (GIS) reporting, equipped

as a norm for clearance teams, negating nongovernmental organiza-

with integral medical support, and deployable anywhere in the liber-

tions (NGO) cost advantages. Since virtually all ICC teams were domi-

ated areas of Iraq within a twenty-four-hour period. The RRTs were

nated by large numbers of international personnel, their statements of

backed by a single, on-call international technical advisor who did not

work built in higher personnel and security costs as an accepted cost

deploy. The RRTs relied on local security, eliminating the constraints

of doing business. NGOs accredited for clearance in Iraq could there-

and costs associated with predominately international staff and less

fore find themselves responding to statements of work that assumed

mobile-heavy teams equipped with mechanical assets.

security costs based on an ICC model despite NGOs’ reliance on less

Repositioning. UNMAS positioned itself to (1) rewrite the way

costly local staff as well as associated operational advantages, includ-

business was conducted through statements of work based on evidence-

ing a reduced security requirement, thereby negating their competi-

based data measuring time-on-task as a function of relative diffi-

tive advantage while adopting the ICC’s disadvantages. This situation

culty (the lethality index) and validated operational concepts (e.g.,

would not begin to change until late 2018 when UNMAS awarded its

RRT teams) that could provide both flexibility in tune with changing

first commercial contract for EH clearance in Iraq to an NGO.

Phase 2: The Changes
Statements of Work. The experience of Phase 1 strongly sug-

evidence-based assessment of the intended geographical area,

gested other changes were necessary including re-design of statements

the impact of the conflict there, its IED and EH threat charac-

of work, the part of each contract that detailed the methodology for
delivery of services using an effects-based approach toward delivery of

teristics, likely task types, and mobility/travel requirements.7
•

services.6 By 2019, UNMAS was developing evidence-based measure-

technical factors8 derived from UNMAS intelligence analysis as

ment useful in assessing time-on-task for appropriate skillsets (the
lethality index) and adapting and testing an agile, flexible team concept

a guide to ensure adequacy of delivery proposals.
•

Capability. Clearance partners demonstrate their capability

(the RRTs) which, taken together, promised the low-cost, high-return

to deliver the required clearance outcome(s) through a detailed

model sought for a Phase 2.

analysis of tasks, and their working procedures and practices as

Effects-based. This inherently fairer approach gave potential
clearance partners more freedom and an opportunity to focus on

meeting relevant national/international standards.
•

Enhancement. Clearance partners include mentoring and

outcomes rather than dictating means of delivery. Thereby, UNMAS

development of both individual and team skills in a logical way

not only achieved a desired outcome but also tested potential clear-

such that teams can plan, deliver, and report effectively on the

ance partners’ existing knowledge while encouraging a just enough

task types they have been trained to conduct: capacity enhance-

approach to resources, thus promoting innovation and cost-effectiveness while meeting IMAS standards.
Accordingly, consistent with its evidence-based measurement and
agile, flexible team concepts, future statements of work were framed
using an effects-based approach to clearance delivery around the following parameters:
•
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Requirements. Clearance partners use environmental and

ment is as important as clearance.
•

Risk

management. Clearance partners demonstrate a

dynamic and proactive approach to risk management to predefined levels that are “as low as reasonably practicable.”
Transition. By 2019, UNMAS Iraq had worked through details of a
two-step approach as agreed with its procurement partners to transi-

Intelligence analysis. UNMAS includes an initial work

tion to an effects-based approach and was ready with a first clearance

package based on lethality index measurements to ensure that

contract, including a statement of work based on three parameters

clearance partners base their proposals on a thorough and

open to both ICCs and NGOs. Accordingly, UNMAS aimed to

that UNMAS could comment and/or intervene constructively

shorten the mobilization phase by providing precise environ-

•

and developmentally to address concerns at any time.

mental and technical information related to current and poten-

•

•

tial locations, thereby ensuring ICCs and NGOs could reflect

This first step in the transition to full effects-based clearance activi-

this information in terms of proposed team composition and

ties was delivered with a contract for clearance in Ninewa that com-

equipment as cost effectiveness/value for money;

menced in January 2020, followed by the second step in October 2020

limit international staff and increase national staff levels and

when the new grant partnership model was signed and initiated.

ownership, both of which are consistent with a commitment to

Statements of work for a two-year time frame included management,

mentoring and development of national resources along with

programs, operations, support, quality assurance, leadership, risk

cost reduction; and

management, and resource mobilization as parameters in anticipa-

ensure proper oversight by linking the operational delivery to a

tion of fully-qualified, Iraqi-managed clearance capability sustained

pilot study using an UNMAS risk management tool set dating

by international and national NGOs.

from contract signature onward, affording a visibility of risk so

Phase 3: The Transition
Even as UNMAS was developing an evidence-based measurement

•

tool useful in assessing time-on-task for appropriate skillsets (the

Partnership. UNMAS would approach operational oversight
and quality assurance on a cooperative basis, with an emphasis

lethality index) and adapting and testing an agile, flexible team con-

on coaching and mentoring delivery partners so as to build local

cept that, taken together, promised the low-cost, high-return model

capacity, confidence, and independence.

sought in Phase 2, the experience of Phase 1 strongly suggested other

•

changes were necessary. These included a transition in advance of an

Sustainability. Delivery partners should train initially with
minimal direct international technical supervision so as to

UNMAS exit to a stronger leadership role for DMA. During this tran-

strengthen and sustain national capability to the point that it is

sition, UNMAS saw itself moving into a consulting role, gradually

self-sustaining and self-supervising.

transferring ownership of the day-to-day management of clearance

•

tasks under contract. By mid-2019, UNMAS Iraq had introduced four

of the areas it operates within, thus bolstering acceptance of

management initiatives to guide those making decisions on both sides
while managing the expectations of all, namely:

Identity. National capability should represent the ethnography
clearance teams and their work.

•

Gender. UNMAS and the DMA would share a leadership role
to assure that all strategic, managerial, and operational decisionmaking, planning, and participation would reflect both women’s
and men’s experiences, needs, and perspectives.
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previously used a prosthetic center located in Sana’a; however as the

The impact of the medical care, typically prosthetic limbs, is huge

city is no longer under the control of the elected government of Yemen,

for the Yemeni survivor beneficiaries. MLI has observed, and YALS

the program no longer uses this facility.

confirms, that landmine survivors with limited mobility face immense

Most of the survivors are from rural areas, so it is necessary to

difficulties in their daily lives, particularly in rural areas where resi-

provide them with transportation to the prosthetic facility as well as

dents often must walk a long way to collect firewood, tend to animals,

accommodations. The fitting of a prosthetic limb occurs over a num-

and perform daily chores. Children landmine survivors are often

ber of appointments before the final prosthetic product is finished and

unable to attend school due to inaccessible buildings and also face

ready for wear. Transportation is provided from their villages to the

stigmas surrounding their physical disabilities. The prosthetic limbs

prosthetic centers, and the accommodations selected are hotels in safe

that MLI and YALS provide to the survivors are designed to be durable

neighborhoods near the medical facility. At least one parent accom-

and low-tech, accounting for rough terrain and limited repair facilities

panies child landmine survivors receiving artificial limbs. YALS staff

and local technology. The vast majority of the survivor beneficiaries

members are present to monitor and document the process, and to

report a high level of satisfaction with their new limbs, as they report

ensure that the survivor recipients are satisfied with their care. Since

improved mobility and independence.

the program began in 2011, 386 men, women, and child landmine survivors have received medical care through MLI’s program.

Vocational Training and Micro-Grants
Vocational training. Similar to medical assistance, the process

Sewing courses for women have proven to be quite successful. The

of identifying landmine survivors desiring and needing vocational

majority of recent female survivors participating in these courses have

training begins in the governorates, where the YALS coordinators

been from Aden, Al Hudaydah, Lahij, and Taiz Governorates. Each

collect data, meet the survivors, and share their profiles with the in-

graduate of the sewing course receives a sewing machine, fabric, and

country program manager, YALS, and MLI. Once MLI approves the

items such as thread, scissors, buttons etc., to take home upon course

selection of trainees, YALS arranges the vocational training courses,

completion to employ their newly learned skills and provide support

typically one course for women and one course for men each quar-

for their families. A sewing room has been created at the YALS Center

ter. Coordination with local authorities is often required to ensure

to provide successful trainees with materials to produce items for bar-

that MLI and YALS have permission to conduct the training and, at

ter or sale in their villages. The sewing room also gives participants the

times, to allow survivors and YALS teams to travel from one gover-

chance to sell their work from the Center.

norate to another.

A computer training lab with high-speed internet connectivity

MLI’s MVA program has funded a variety of training topics through-

was established in 2011 at the YALS Center and equipped with state-

out the years. The survivors themselves often suggest the vocational

of-the-art computers and software for selected survivors to receive

training subject, as they identify the
skill they prefer and have the physical capacity to perform. The training topics have included beekeeping,
carpentry, computer/typing skills,
sewing, and weaving. All courses are
offered to enhance employment and
income generation opportunities and
to assist survivors in their reintegration into society.
The training courses each take

Hend is a thirty-three-year-old Yemeni landmine
survivor, married, and lives in a small village. In 2002,
Hend was caring for her sheep near her village when
she was injured by a mine explosion, losing both of
her legs. Hend received medical assistance through
MLI’s MVA Yemen program in 2013. She later successfully completed the training course and received a
sewing machine, which she now uses to provide for
her family. Hend says the monthly income derived
from sewing helps cover her monthly rent.

place five days a week over the course

instruction from a certified teacher.
This computer training course was
suspended in 2013 due to internet
instability; however, it provided
valuable training to survivor participants who continue to have access to
computers. Labibah Abdo Saif is a
thirty-one-year-old female landmine
survivor who lost her right leg and
right eye due to a landmine explosion
at the age of nine. In 2013, Labibah
received computer training through

of one month. Participating survivors are provided transportation

the MVA program. With her computer training, Labibah acquired a

from their homes to the vocational facility, as well as accommodation

government job and also serves as a team leader in mine risk educa-

in hotels near the vocational facility and a modest stipend. The training

tion (MRE) at YALS.

courses vary in size, with sewing classes having ten to fifteen students

MLI has offered beekeeping, carpentry, and weaving courses to adult

per class, and weaving classes usually having six to eight students per

male landmine survivors. The carpentry participants built ramps for

class. The training courses are segregated by gender due to cultural con-

wheelchairs at many schools and homes of other survivor amputees,

siderations and norms. Most of the vocational courses are held at rental

greatly improving access and mobility. Unfortunately, high lumber

facilities chosen based on their proximity to the survivor participants

prices and scarcity of materials have limited the carpentry training

as well as the safety of the general area.

course in recent years. Beekeeping also became difficult, as the course
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Figure 1. Diagram of individual PFM-1 anti-personnel landmine alongside KSF-1
dispersal cassette (adapted from de Smet et al. 2018).
All figures courtesy of the authors.
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has a number of shortcomings: (1) they have high false-positive alarm

landmine (also known as the butterfly mine) as an index example

rates in the presence of metallic clutter; (2) they are are time and labor

of a small, low-metallic scatterable landmine. This type of mine is

intensive, especially in difficult terrain; and (3) they entail operator risk.

emblematic of a wide-area aerial-mining strategy responsible for both

Some of these shortcomings can be mitigated if suspected hazardous

a legacy landmine concern and a looming threat of future contamina-

areas (SHAs) are constrained by autonomous surveys providing an ini-

tion, as variants of these mines and their deployment systems remain

tial assessment of mine presence and subsequently expanded to clas-

in active service. The PFM-1 is composed of polyethylene plastic that

sify mine type, mine condition, minefield density and orientation, soil

presents a particularly difficult challenge to HMA operations.15,16

type, and other environmental parameters. Modern unpiloted aerial

Other plastic anti-personnel mines have historically been composed

vehicle (UAV) platforms capable of flying at low altitudes and collecting

of Type IV plastic, differing from the f lexible polyethylene used for

autonomous surveys, coupled with sensitive and compact visual, ther-

the PFM-1,15 which was notoriously widely used during the Soviet-

mal, multispectral, and magnetic sensors, often allow operators to rap-

Afghan War (1979–1989). Although some of these mines have dete-

idly identify small anthropogenic targets previously identifiable only in

riorated over time, many of the nearly ten million mines remain an

ground surveys in certain situations.14

active threat today due to cold climate preservation.17 These anti-

Over the last decade UAVs have become more reliable, and their

personnel mines are designed to be ballistically dispersed from

push into the consumer market considerably decreased their costs.

aluminum KSF-1S cartridges that contain four dispenser racks of

In parallel with the advancement of UAV technology, modern min-

eighteen mines with seventy-two mines in total (Figure 1). Guided

iaturized optical and geophysical sensors became smaller, more sensi-

by their stabilizing wings, the mines fall gently to the surface where

tive, less costly, and mountable on UAV platforms. Advances in UAV

they remain scattered in ellipsoidal minefields of 8–10 m x 18–20

and sensor technologies enabled the development of reliable UAS for

m. While the original PFM-1 design was subsequently updated to

wide-area, high-resolution remote sensing and geophysical surveys to

include a self-destruction timer, modernized PFM-1S type mines fall

address some of the most pressing humanitarian challenges.8–12 With

short of the self-destruction criteria in Protocol II of the Convention

recent developments in small autonomous UAVs, advanced sensors

on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional

have the potential to significantly contribute to the field of HMA, as

Weapons,18 as studies show that nearly half of PFM-1S mines fail to

this allows for rapid low-cost data acquisition over wide areas in a safe

self-detonate upon deployment.19 Many of the original PFM-1 stock-

and time-efficient manner. However, the emergence of UAS surveying

piles were destroyed by signatories of the APMBC, but considerable

has led to the new problem of analyzing these large (both in terms of

stockpiles of variants of the PFM-1 mines are thought to remain in

area covered and file size) and prohibitively complex datasets, requir-

arsenals of multiple countries. 20 Today, Russia hosts the world’s larg-

ing advances in machine learning to aid interpretation. As we have

est stockpile of anti-personnel mines with an estimated 26.5 mil-

learned firsthand, manual analysis of these large surveys is operation-

lion. 21 Moreover, as recently as 2019, the Russian army introduced

ally difficult, subjective, and sometimes inconsistent. The application

the UMZ-G multipurpose tracked vehicle with minelaying capabili-

of deep learning to remotely collect wide-area surveys (greater than 15

ties compatible with PFM-1 bearing cassettes capable of dispersing

m2) improves the reliability of NTS and provides stakeholders with the

nearly 20,000 PFM-1 type mines per hour. 22

quantitative data necessary to plan HMA activities. This area reduc-

Previous drone flights collected over inert PFM-1 mines in proxy

tion methodology may ultimately be used to help guide ground dem-

environments in New York provided a critical proof of concept on the

ining activities to reduce search area size and drive down HMA costs

use of drones to aerially identify small plastic PFM-1 anti-personnel

while reducing operational risks.

mines from visual, thermal, and multispectral imagery. Baur et al.

We present a machine learning case study focused on initial detec-

2020 presented a case study where a machine learning workflow was

tion and identification of the widely-used PFM-1 anti-personnel

developed to automate the detection of these landmines for the first

time, resulting in a 71.5% accuracy rate in identifying and locating

proof of concept and laying the foundation for other researchers to

PFM-1 mines from a drone survey.23 This study greatly improves upon

develop similar deep learning models for detection of other types of

the previous model by increasing the detection accuracy by over 20%.

landmines, UXO, and ERW. In order to expand the capabilities of

This was accomplished by increasing the volume of training data more

this particular CNN for automated detection of landmines or ERW

than three-fold, now including twenty-five 10 x 20 m minefield ortho-

other than the PFM-1, additional datasets of novel minefields would

photos in four environments (rubble, sand, and two types of grass

be required. With these data, our CNN has the potential to be gener-

settings) with a total of 590 PFM-1 mines and 136 KSF casings photo-

alized for automated detection and coordinate return of small objects

graphed, adding negative samples, and a more customizable method of

in any raster dataset, including geophysical, RGB, thermal, and mul-

splitting orthomosaics.

tispectral orthomosaics. Because of the self-learning capability of the

In this study, we demonstrate that our convolutional neural net-

neural network approach to detection and classification, it is impor-

work (CNN)-based results can be improved with the addition of new

tant that researchers and field operators work together to develop

information from ground verification surveys or the addition of more

methods for data sharing of aerial images, so the HMA community

imagery data. We present a specialized tool for detection of the PFM-1

can continue to collectively refine and improve the reliability of deep

anti-personnel landmine from RGB (visual) imagery, while providing

learning methods that are rapidly gaining traction. 24

Background
Object Detection. The branch of machine learning used in this
paper—object detection—involves the general goal of detecting and
locating predetermined objects in often dynamic and complex environments. We used supervised object detection, which involves training an algorithm (a CNN in our case) to recognize objects by showing
it a large number of images containing those objects (landmines in
our case). The algorithm uses this set of images, the training set, to
learn the distinguishing characteristics of the objects and form a generalized model in order to detect the objects in different images in the
future. The algorithm is trained in epochs (rounds), where every image
in the training set is analyzed and where the algorithm is tuned to be
able to recognize images like it in the future. After the training of the
algorithm is complete, a pre-trained model is created with the generalized model of the objects encoded in it. The accuracy of this model
is evaluated using the testing set, containing images that were completely withheld from the training set. The lack of overlap in the training and testing sets is designed to ensure that the testing set provides
an unbiased evaluation of the model, as it will not be trained to detect
the objects as they appear in the testing set; it will have to rely on the

Algorithm 1. Coordinate computation
1: size = 700 (size of each cropped image)
2: overlap = 70 (overlap of cropped images in pixels)
3: cropped_image_name = ‘Grass_RGB_Split1205.tif ’
4: split_x, split_y = 370, 360 (pxl position of obj in cropped image)
5: ortho_easting, ortho_northing = 420000, 4600000 (UTM coords of ortho)
6: x_res, y_res = 0.00644, -0.00644 (m/pxl of orthophoto)
7:
8: (Get col and row of cropped image in ortho)
9: row = two ints following “Split” in cropped_image_name = 12
10: col = two ints following row in cropped_image_name = 5
11:
12: (Get pxl position of obj in respective orthomosaic)
13: ortho_x = split_x + (col *(size-overlap))
14: ortho_y = split_y + (row *(size-overlap))
15:
16: (Get easting and northing coords of obj)
17: obj_casting = ortho_casting + (ortho_x*x_res)
18: obj_northing = ortho_northing + (ortho_y*y_res)
19:
20: (Get latitude and longitude coords of obj - python utm package)
21: obj_lat, obj_lon = utm.to_latlon(obj_easting, obj_northing)
Algorithm 1. Pseudocode outlining coordinate computation of
object.

generalized model of the objects it obtained from the training set.
The model is evaluated using three relative accuracy scores: preci-

For our implementation of object detection, we used an actively-

sion (positive predictive value), recall (sensitivity), and F1 (harmonic

maintained, open-source GitHub repository called Faster region-based

mean). These scores are calculated from our raw evaluation metrics:

convolutional neural network (R-CNN).26 An important component of

true positives, false positives, and false negatives. Precision is a mea-

the Faster R-CNN architecture, which we modified to achieve a higher

sure of the relative amount of positively labeled objects that were cor-

accuracy with our dataset, is the anchor box. These make it possible

rectly labeled and is calculated using the following formula:

for the network to locate objects of different scales and different aspect

Formula 1: prec =

true positive
true positive + false positive

ratios quickly and effectively. Instead of scanning an entire image
using a sliding window of a set size and aspect ratio, nine anchor boxes

Recall is a measure of the relative number of desired objects that were

are centered around every sixteenth pixel in the image. The default

positively labeled and is calculated using the following formula:

anchor boxes consist of all nine combinations of boxes with a ½:1, 1:1,

Formula 2: rec =

and 2:2 aspect ratio, and boxes with a scale of 8, 16, and 32 multiplied

true positive
true positive + false negative

by the default base anchor: 16.27

The F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall; it is calculated using the following formula:25

Formula 3: F1 = 2*

prec*rec
prec+rec
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Past, Present, Future: Mine Action in Motion by Ambassador Stefano Toscano [ from page 8 ]
1.
Reference Sri Lanka Strategy.
2.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, much of the detection R&D and trials were related to metal detectors. The hopes at that time were that the Ground
Compensation and Large Loop detection were going to be the silver bullet, which wasn’t the case. In the 2010s, R&D moved towards the dual and
double sensor detection (metal detection and GPR). While this advancement did enhance the efficiency of work, it by no means provided the silver
bullet (for many reasons) that the sector was (is) seeking. However, through this R&D work, progress has been made and its undeniable that efficiency and safety of operations has improved as a result.
3.
The foundation behind the Humanitarian-Development-Peace-Nexus (HDPN), also known as the triple nexus, is based on the need for stronger
collaboration, coherence, and complementarity towards the delivery of collective outcomes. By leveraging the comparative advantages of its three
dimensions, the nexus has the potential to reduce vulnerabilities and decrease the number of appeals that remain unanswered, while strengthening
risk management capacities and tackling the root causes of conflict. In addition, this approach has been at the center of multilateral efforts to fulfil the
commitments made at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The
triple nexus promotes a change in the way activities are planned, implemented, monitored, reported, and financed in order to more effectively and
coherently meet needs, reduce risks, and build resiliency in the short, medium, and long term.
Mine Action: The Early Years by Ian Mansfield [ from page 11 ]
1.
Cambodia, The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities, page 21, The Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997.
2.
To Walk the Earth in Safety, US Department of State, 1999. https://bit.ly/3z4FWkx.
3.
The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacity, The Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997.
4.
Afghanistan – The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacity, page 41, The Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997.
5.
United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/49/215 Assistance in Mine Clearance of 23 December 1994.
6.
Summary – UNGA Resolution A/RES/49/215 Assistance in Mine Clearance of 23 December 1994.
7.
Mine Action and Effective Coordination; The United Nations Policy, UNMAS/1998/08/vers.1.6.
8.
After the Guns Fall Silent; The Enduring Legacy of Landmines, Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams, VVAF, 1995.
9.
“The Mine Action Support Group (MASG).” E-Mine, UN Mine Action. https://www.mineaction.org/en/mine-action-support-group-masg
10.
Details of MASG meetings can be found on the website at: “MASG Meeting Notes,” E-Mine, UN Mine Action. https://bit.ly/3z55DkT.
11.
International Mine Action Standards, GICHD. https://www.mineactionstandards.org/
Applying “All Reasonable Effort” in the Falkland Islands Mine Clearance Programme: Encouraging Efficient, Confident, and Timely
Evidence-Based Land Release Decision Making by David Hewitson and Guy Marot [ from page 16 ]
1.
Previous incarnations of the LRC, responsible for work in earlier phases of the programme included Bactec International Ltd and Dynasafe Bactec
Ltd.
2.
From Phase 5 project contractual documentation, Section 4 – Statement of Service Requirement.
3.
IMAS 07.11 Land Release, Edition 1, Amendment 5, February 2019, includes broad guidance on the process elements influencing ARE. The recently
released TNMA 07.11/03 All Reasonable Effort (ARE), Version 1.0, March 2021, provides more detailed advice on what constitutes ARE and how to
demonstrate its application. Sources such as https://www.hse.gov.uk/managing/theory/alarpglance.htm explain the concept and practice of ALARP.
4.
IMAS 07.14 Risk Management in Mine Action, First Edition, February 2019, section 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations.
5.
In some case over 40cm of peat had ‘grown’ over the 1982 mine layer surface level, and on beach areas 11m of sand had accumulated.
6.
Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the Falkland Islands were likely to contain other forms of ERW as well as mines. Mine clearance procedures
were targeted only on those parts of the SHA where mines were expected until the LRC and DPO were confident that they had all been found and
dealt with. At that point the remaining area within the fenced boundary of the SHA could be searched for non-landmine UXO (mortar rounds, grenades, etc.) using the much faster BAC techniques. At some SHAs less than 5 percent of the total SHA area was subject to mine clearance procedures,
but the entire area needed to be checked for other UXO hazards.
Linking Mine Action and Development: The Case of Komyshuvakha by Nick Vovk [ from page 28 ]
1.
G. Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, London, Zed Books, 2008.
2.
McGrath, R. (2000), Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance, A Resource Book, London, Pluto Press, p. 17.
3.
PRIO, (2004) Reclaiming the Fields of War: Mainstreaming Mine Action in Development (p. 10): https://bit.ly/2McoXdn.
4.
IMAS 4.10 (Amendment 10, February 2019), p. 29: https://bit.ly/3juebM5.
5.
Barlevi, Hanoch (2003) “The Mine Action/Mine Risk Education Integrated Approach,” Journal of Mine Action: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1, Article 38. https://bit.
ly/3htHWhk.
6.
GICHD, Linking Mine Action and Development: Humanitarian and Development NGOs, 2008, p. 72. https://bit.ly/369kQps.
7.
Gasser, Russell (2008) “Linking Mine Action and Development: Local-level Benefits and Challenges,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action: Vol. 12 :
Iss. 2, Article 1. https://bit.ly/2Y7wj4C.
8.
Paterson, Ted and Filippino, Eric (2006) “The Road to Mine Action and Development: The Life-Cycle Perspective of Mine Action,” Journal of Mine
Action: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 23. https://bit.ly/3c5cPWt.
9.
Van Der Linden, Filip (2006) “Mine Action and the Millennium Development Goals,” Journal of Mine Action: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 24. https://bit.
ly/3644uPa.
10.
Hofmann, Ursign and Juergensen, Olaf (2017) “Preparing for the Future: How the SDGs Impact Mine Action,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons
Destruction: Vol. 21: Iss. 3, Article 12. https://bit.ly/39Z3c8Z.
11.
Humanitarian Demining, Geneva International Centre for and Programme, United Nations Development, “Leaving no one Behind: Mine Action and
the Sustainable Development Goals” (2017). https://bit.ly/2KFQZxq.
12.
Downs, Charles (2010) “Linking Mine Action and Economic Development,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action: Vol. 14 : Iss. 1, Article 19. https://
bit.ly/3qHZMOT.
13.
Lundberg, John (2006) “Humanitarian Demining as a Precursor to Economic Development,” Journal of Mine Action: Vol. 9 Iss. 2, Article 22. https://
bit.ly/36aI4f3.
14.
Bogdanov N. and Nikolic A. 2013. Area Based Development Approach – Evidence from Border Rural Region Drina-Sava. Book of Proceedings from
the Seminar Agriculture and Rural Development – Challenges of Transition and Integration Processes. Ed. N. Bogdanov and S. Stevanovic. Serbia,
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23.
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26.
27.
28.
29.
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31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Belgrade. https://bit.ly/2OvnwI3.
Santini F., S.S. Matus, G. Louwagie et al. 2012. Facilitating an Area-Based Development Approach in Rural Regions in the Western Balkans. Volume 1:
Main Report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union; Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://bit.
ly/37g8qNl.
Pearce, C.J. (1999) “The Operational Implementation of the International Humanitarian Demining Development Concept,” Journal of Mine Action:
Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 14. https://bit.ly/362jcpN.
Harfst J. 2006. A Practitioner’s Guide to Area-Based Development Programming. p. 9-13. UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe & CIS. https://bit.
ly/2NxVnQ3.
DG ECHO, Forgotten Crisis Assessment 2019: https://bit.ly/36GYn3P.
Government of Ukraine, 2020, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Deadline Extension Request: https://bit.ly/2NBP51U.
Landmine Monitor 2020 (p. 2; 36): https://bit.ly/3osj4GN.
Due to the fact that Ukraine does not possess a state-run EO incident database DRC-DDG has been tracking EO accidents by collating open resource
data since 2014: https://bit.ly/33K3QVg.
Crowther, Edward (2019) “Contamination in Eastern Ukraine: Observations by OSCE,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction: Vol. 2: Iss.
1, Article 9. https://bit.ly/39efICx.
Robinson, Toby and O’Keeffe, Rosanna (2019) “The Challenges of Humanitarian Mine Clearance in Ukraine,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons
Destruction: Vol. 23: Iss. 1, Article 8. https://bit.ly/367DK08.
International Crisis Group. 2020. Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas. Europe Report No. 261. https://bit.ly/3fsmPJh.
Humanitarian Needs Overview: Ukraine. 2020. p. 24-25. https://bit.ly/3piX9CM.
REACH, Protection Assessment of Isolated Settlements in Government-Controlled Areas Along the Contact Line, p. 33, (Ukraine: REACH, 2019),
https://bit.ly/3kf8NMe.
IMPACT. 2020. Area Based Risk Assessment: Popasna Raion, Luhansk Oblast, Eastern Ukraine. https://bit.ly/369d3rU.
REACH, 2019, Economic Security Assessment: Government-Controlled Areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts Within 20km of the Contact Line. p.
2. https://bit.ly/3odwRAG.
Luhansk Oblast Development Strategy (2021-2027): https://bit.ly/2OJVLvL.
These include Ukrainians (52%), Russians (40%), Belarusians (5%), and Moldovans (3%). Many are pensioners (40%) with some children (10%).
Employed represent 30% of the settlement, mostly as farmers as well as miners, pharmacists, teachers, etc.
Data collected through DRC-DDG needs assessments between 2018 and 2021 through (phone and in-person) key informant interviews, focus group
discussions, and participant observations.
By June 2021, DRC-DDG demining teams released 66,417 sq m of land and permanently marked 23,119 sq m of contamination in Komyshuvakha;
their work will continue until autumn 2021.
In doing so, DRC-DDG EORE team reached 619 residents of Komyshuvakha by June 2021 (or 20% of the entire population): 42.3% male, 57.7%
female; 14.7% children (between six and 11 years old), 14.2% adolescent (12 to 17 years old), 38.5% adults (18 to 59 years of age), and 32.6% elderly
(60 years old and above).
The M&E system was designed to be both formative (field monitoring visits, programme quality checks, quality assurance and quality control, etc.)
and summative (focusing on outcomes and capturing lessons learned). Moreover, participatory methodologies are being used, inclusive of needs assessments, community meetings, collection and analyzes of feedback and concerns shared by beneficiaries via complains and reporting mechanism as
well as through focus group discussions and key informant interviews.
Chiovelli, Giorgio, Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Papaioannou, Elias (2018) “Landmines and Spatial Development,” Working Paper 24758, National
Bureau of Economic Research. https://bit.ly/3bvwii2.
Rasmussen, Ph.D., Lewis (2020) “Whither HMA Policy: Linking HMA and Development Assistance,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction: Vol. 24: Iss. 1, Article 3. https://bit.ly/2M16YqA.
As seen at two events organized in 2021 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (i.e., ‘Beyond Square Meters Cleared: Mine Action and Development’: https://bit.ly/33Me4V5) and GICHD (i.e., ‘The Sustainable Development Outcomes of Mine Action in Jordan’: https://bit.
ly/3ynK8wT).
Due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent quarantines as well as the winter stand-down period (with cold and snowy
weather conditions preventing demining in eastern Ukraine) clearance continues until present day.
DRC-DDG legal assistance team was funded under a different donor.

Developing National Landmine Clearance Capacity in Ukraine by Tobias Hewitt and Ronan Shenhav [ from page 35 ]
1.
Landmine Monitor, Annual Report 2020, p. 36–38, http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3168934/LM2020.pdf.
2.
The most heavily contaminated areas are thought to be around Vinnytsia, Ternopil, Zhytomyr, Dnipro, Kyiv, Odesa and Kharkiv. The Crimean peninsula remains one of the areas most affected by ERW contamination from WWII. Landmine Monitor, Ukraine 1999, http://archives.the-monitor.org/
index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=ukraine&pqs_section.
3.
Until 2012 the called the Ministry of Emergency Situations.
4.
Through the SES Department of Pyrotechnic Works and Humanitarian Demining.
5.
Landmine Monitor, Ukraine 2014, http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2014/ukraine/mine-action.aspx.
6.
Government of Ukraine, Official website of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, ‘Coordination of mine action activities’ (visited on 23 February
2021), https://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/protiminna-diyalnist/koordinacziya-protiminnoi-diyalnosti.html.
7.
An inter-ministerial working group was up for this purpose in 2006. The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 131 of 18 February 2009 adopted the State
Program for Demining by the Ministry of Emergency Situations for 2009–2014, foreseeing clearance of 15 km2 over five years with the destruction of
500,000 items of ERW. In 2010, relevant ministries were tasked to forward proposals by to establish of a national body for demining and a presidential
decree established a NMAA in 2013. Landmine Monitor, Ukraine 2014, http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2014/ukraine/mine-action.aspx.
8.
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), United National Development Programme (UNDP), Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD).
9.
The Ukrainian Institute of Standardization order № 511 ‘On the adoption of national standards’ of December 19, 2018, adopted the national standard
DSTU P 8820-1:2018 ‘Mine action. Management Processes. Basic Provisions,’ which entered into force on April 1, 2019. However these have not been
operationalised. Government of Ukraine, Official website of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, ‘Coordination of mine action activities’ (visited on
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23 February 2021), https://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/protiminna-diyalnist/koordinacziya-protiminnoi-diyalnosti.html.
Saving Lives in Eastern Ukraine: Alternative EORE Approaches by Olena Kryvova [ from page 43 ]
1.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN UKRAINE, AT A GLANCE,” 25 November 2020, https://bit.ly/2OKDbDF.
2.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Ukraine Situation Report,” last updated 25 January 2021, https://bit.
ly/2NxQkzm.
3.
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Review of New Technologies and Methodologies for Explosive Ordnance Risk Education
(EORE) in Challenging Contexts, August 2020, https://bit.ly/3qqH12x.
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5.
БезМин,” VKontakte, https://vk.com/bezmininfo.
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education in Ukraine during the COVID-19 Pandemic by Andro Mathewson and Asya Bolotova [ from page
49 ]
1.
Council on Foreign Relations. Conflict in Ukraine. Accessed May 21, 2021. https://on.cfr.org/3h4r53C
2.
UNOCHA. Humanitarian Needs Overview Ukraine. United Nations. February, 2021. https://bit.ly/3jJWfyS
3.
UNOCHA. Humanitarian Needs Overview Ukraine. United Nations, June, 2020. https://bit.ly/38IWJyT
4.
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5.
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8.
UNICEF has been providing laptops to schools and children across Ukraine during the COVID-19 pandemic to help minimize the negative effects of
the pandemic on education.
9.
For further examples and an in-depth discussion of virtual reality as a tool for EORE, please see: GICHD. Review of New Technologies and Methodologies for EORE in Challenging Contexts. September 2020. 37-41. https://bit.ly/2WZ8MG6
Landmine Clearance and Socio-economic Development: A Study in Colombia by Oliver Ford, Amasia Zargarian, and Eric Keefer [ from
page 53 ]
1.
A department is the Colombian equivalent of a state in the United States.
2.
AICMA downloadable spreadsheets, accessed May 2021.
3.
“Clearing the Legacy of Conflict in Colombia.” The HALO Trust. https://bit.ly/3lBe431.
4.
A vereda is an administrative division within a municipality. It represents an important geographical demarcation for humanitarian mine action in
Colombia.
Impact Caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic on Humanitarian Demining in Colombia by Salomé Valencia Aguirre, Angela De Santis,
Ph.D., and Sebastián Tovar Jaramillo [ from page 60 ]
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Moving the Story Forward: Utilizing Deminer Narratives to Increase Women’s Empowerment in Mine Action and Beyond by Brenna
Matlock [ from page 64 ]
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The study utilized the definition provided by John Creswell in Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, “Phenomenological research is a design of inquiry…in which the researcher describes the lived experiences of individuals about a phenomenon as described
by participants. This description culminates in the essence of the experiences for several individuals who have all experienced the phenomenon.” In
this case, the lived experience of women who are deminers is examined in the study.
2.
According to The SAFE Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods, “Rhetorical theory is fundamentally concerned with composition, forms,
functions, means, venues, producers, audiences, effects, and criticism of discourse.” Rhetorical strategies and theories are utilized to examine the texts
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4.
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Article 4.
Digital Rehabilitation Technologies Deliver Hope for Survivors by Abder Banoune [ from page 68 ]
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As it is shown by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Reports 2020, over the previous year casualties from cluster munition attacks were reported
in Syria and Libya, while casualties due to cluster munition remnants were recorded in ten countries and other areas: Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR,
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